Michigan Court of Appeals rules domicile determines PIP benefits responsibility

By Kelly Caplan
BridgeTower Media Newswires
 
DETROIT—The trial court did not err in finding that, for insurance purposes, a bicyclist was domiciled at his grandmother’s residence and was no longer living with his father at the time of his injuries, a Michigan Court of Appeals panel has ruled.

Summary disposition for defendants Central Mutual Insurance Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company was granted regarding the bicyclist’s domicile at the time a motor vehicle collided with his bike causing him severe injuries and later death.

The Eaton Circuit Court held that Home-Owners, as the insurer of his grandmother, bore liability for paying all of the bicyclist’s no-fault personal injury protection benefits.

The unpublished per curiam opinion, Home-Owners Insurance Co. v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., was issued by Judges Brock A. Swartzle, Jane E. Markey, and James Robert Redford.

Michael F. Schmidt, who represented defendant Liberty Mutual, did not provide a comment. Parisa R. Gold, who represented defendant Central Mutual, and Kimberlee A. Hillock, who represented plaintiff Home-Owners, did not respond before deadline.

Background

Brent Hannahs had lived with friends from age 17 ½ when he stopped living with his father, Clint Hannahs, in Eaton Rapids. Brent received permission to move in with his grandmother, Merna Rasmussen, in Lansing, according to the COA opinion.

Brent began living with Rasmussen on Aug. 26, 2016, and lived at Rasmussen’s house until Nov. 6, 2016, when, while riding his bike, a tow truck operated by Shroyer Development Corp. collided with him. Brent was 19 at the time of his accident and later died.

Plaintiff Home-Owners sued for declaratory judgment and damages, alleging that Brent lacked domicile at Rasmussen’s house at the time of his accident, and that it had no statutory obligation to pay for Brent’s PIP benefits.

The plaintiff alleged that defendant Liberty Mutual (Clint’s insurer) or Central Mutual (Shroyer’s insurer) or State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (Brent’s mother Roxanna Hannahs’ insurer) had the obligation to pay Brent’s PIP benefits and reimburse Home-Owners for the benefits it paid.

Home-Owners and State Farm stipulated to State Farm’s dismissal after discovery. With approval of the other parties, the trial court dismissed State Farm with prejudice.

Home-Owners, Liberty Mutual, and Central Mutual each moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).

The trial court denied Home-Owners’ motion, and granted Liberty Mutual’s and Central Mutual’s respective motions, determining that Brent domiciled with Rasmussen at the time of his accident.

Home-Owners moved for reconsideration, and the trial court denied the motion, stating that Home-Owners presented the same issues that it ruled upon, and failed to demonstrate a palpable error.

Home-Owners appealed.

Analysis

The panel began its analysis by examining MCL 500.3114(1), which provides that “a personal protection insurance policy ‘applies to accidental bodily injury to the person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same household, if the injury arises from a motor vehicle accident.’”

The panel noted that because Brent suffered bodily injury arising from a motor vehicle accident while not a passenger in a motor vehicle, determining which insurer bore responsibility to pay his PIP benefits required deciding where Brent domiciled at the time of his accident.

The panel then turned to the Michigan Supreme Court decision in Grange Ins Co v. Lawrence, 494 Mich 475, 490; 835 NW2d 363 (2013), which considered cases presenting related issues under the no-fault act: “(1) where minor children of divorced parents were domiciled, and (2) whether a family court order establishing custody of minor children conclusively established the minor children’s domicile for purposes of determining coverage under MCL 500.3114(1).”

That court said Michigan courts have defined “domicile” to mean “the place where a person has his true, fixed, permanent home, and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning,” adding that there are “few legal axioms as established as the one providing that every person has a domicile, and that a person may have one—and only one—domicile.”

Additionally, the court said common law distinguishes between a “domicile” and a “residence.”

“A person may have only one domicile, but more than one residence,” the court wrote in Grange. “For purposes of distinguishing ‘domicile’ from ‘residence,’ this Court has explained that ‘domicile is acquired by the combination of residence and the intention to reside in a given place. ... If the intention of permanently residing in a place exists, a residence in pursuance of that intention, however short, will establish a domicile.’”

No equivalence

The Court of Appeals panel then turned to the language of MCL 500.3114(1).

“[T]here is no indication that the Legislature intended to deviate from this well established common-law meaning of the term ‘domicile,’” the panel noted. “And, because a person, from the moment of his birth onward, can only have one domicile within the traditional meaning of that term, it follows that a child, regardless of his parents’ marital status or his multiple legal residences, may also have only one domicile at any given point in time.”

The panel said the Michigan Supreme Court explained that domicile is not the equivalent of residence under MCL 500.3114(1), and clarified in Workman v. Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 404 Mich 477, 496-497; 274 NW2d 373 (1979), that “it did not establish such an equivalency rule. For purposes of the no-fault act, ‘domicile’ must be understood consistent with its historical underpinnings.” (Grange, 494 Mich at 500.)

The Workman multifactor test was not abandoned by the Supreme Court, the panel stated. Rather, Grange made clear that “the Workman factors should be considered and analyzed for determining an adult’s domicile, but not for minor children because they are persons with a legal disability who lack the capacity to acquire a domicile of choice.”

In the current case, after Clint’s and Roxanna’s divorce in 2008, a court awarded Clint sole physical custody of the minor child, Brent. However, when Brent was 17 ½, he left Clint’s custody, and never returned. He turned 18 years old while living separately from both of his parents.

“Because Brent emancipated himself from Clint and suffered his accident as an adult shortly after his 19th birthday, under Grange, the traditional factors for determining his domicile were both relevant and dispositive for determining Brent’s domicile at the time of his accident,” the panel explained. “Accordingly, the trial court properly considered and weighed the Workman factors.”

‘Dairyland’

Finally, the panel stated the trial court did not err when it considered Dairyland Ins Co v. Auto-Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675,682; 333 NW2d 322 (1983).

“The evidence in this case supports finding that the Workman factors all favored finding that Brent domiciled at Rasmussen’s house,” the panel wrote. “The evidence also supported finding that four out of five of the Dairyland factors favored finding that Brent domiciled at Rasmussen’s house.”

The panel rejected Home-Owners’ argument that Brent resided but never domiciled at Rasmussen’s house.

“[T]he evidence establishes that Brent chose to move in with Rasmussen and through his actions and conversations with her indicated his intent to affix his abode at her house and remain with her indefinitely and for an unlimited length of time,” the panel wrote.

“... Therefore, the trial court properly applied the law ... and correctly determined that Brent domiciled at Rasmussen’s house at the time of his accident,” the panel stated. “The trial court correctly ruled that Home-Owners was the priority no-fault insurer with the statutory obligation to pay Brent’s PIP benefits.”