Supreme Court Notebook

Court holds individuals can challenge federal law BOSTON, MA -- The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling that an individual convicted under a federal statute implementing an international treaty has standing to challenge the law on Tenth Amendment grounds could have a ripple effect in a host of future cases, from challenges to the federal health care law to drug litigation. "It is rare that such a short case, and a unanimous case at that, can have an effect on such a broad range of law," said Ilya Shapiro, a senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato Institute and co-author of the group's amicus brief in Bond v. U.S. The defendant in the case found out that her husband had impregnated another woman and began waging a campaign of harassment against the woman - including sprinkling a caustic chemical substance on her mailbox and car door. Instead of facing state law charges brought by local authorities, the defendant was arrested by postal inspectors who caught her tampering with the woman's mailbox. She was ultimately charged with terroristic possession and use of a chemical weapon under 18 U.S.C. §229(a)(1). The law implemented an international treaty designed to prosecute terrorists who used chemical weapons. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the statute was beyond the federal government's enumerated powers. The district court denied the motion, and the defendant pleaded guilty (and was sentenced to six years in prison), reserving the right to appeal. The 3rd Circuit ruled that she had no standing to make a Tenth Amendment challenge. The defendant sought review by the Supreme Court. The government changed its view and filed a brief supporting her argument that she was wrongly denied standing. When the Court granted certiorari, it allowed the government to argue in support of the defendant and appointed amicus to argue in support of the ruling below. In a unanimous ruling, the Court reversed the 3rd Circuit, holding that individuals such as the defendant have standing to challenge laws under which they are convicted. Rejecting the argument that only states have the power to challenge the use of federal laws in circumstances normally reserved to the states, the Court declined to apply contrary language from the 1939 case Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA (306 U. S. 118). Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that the principles of federalism not only protect states' rights, but also "the liberty of all persons within a state by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated governmental power cannot direct or control their actions." Kennedy's six-page discussion of the principles of federalism and individual rights will almost certainly be cited in future cases dealing with the conflict between state and federal law - including the constitutional challenges to the health care law enacted last year, which is currently pending in several federal appellate courts and is expected to soon reach the Supreme Court. "This case has a host of potential ramification [for future cases], from ObamaCare, to allegations that the government has exceeded its power in regulatory preemption cases involving issues like immigration and drug labeling," Shapiro said. "I bet you the next brief that is filed on either side of the [health care] case will cite this case." The case is Bond v. U.S. Supreme Court rules in exclusionary rule case BOSTON, MA -- The exclusionary rule does not preclude admission of evidence collected in a search conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent at the time, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled. The defendant was a passenger in a car when it was pulled over and the driver was arrested for drunk driving. Police asked the defendant to identify himself and he gave a false name. Suspecting he was lying, the officer asked another passenger to identify him, and that passenger did so. The defendant was arrested for providing a false identity to police, and the search incident to arrest uncovered a firearm in his jacket, which was in the car. The defendant was also charged with of possession of a firearm as a felon. He moved to suppress the gun found in his jacket. He acknowledged that the search was permissible under then-existing precedent, but he cited the Court's subsequent ruling in Arizona v. Gant that police cannot search a vehicle incident to an occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and can't reach the vehicle. The district court denied the motion, holding that the search was valid under existing precedent at the time, and that the gun would inevitably have been discovered. The defendant was convicted, and the 11th Circuit affirmed the conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court took up the case and in a 7-2 ruling affirmed, holding that a search based on police reliance on existing precedent placed the search evidence within the exclusionary rule's "good faith" exception. Noting that there was no police misconduct to deter - which is at the heart of the exclusionary rule doctrine - Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority, noted: "The police acted in strict compliance with binding precedent, and their behavior was not wrongful. Unless the exclusionary rule is to become a strict-liability regime, it can have no application in this case." Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissent that was joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The case is Davis v. U.S. Supreme Court rules federal courts can't hike sentences for rehab BOSTON, MA -- The Sentencing Reform Act precludes federal courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term in order to promote a criminal defendant's rehabilitation, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled. The defendant was convicted of smuggling unauthorized aliens into the United States and the government recommended a prison term between 41 and 51 months. The sentencing judge elected to impose a 51-month prison sentence, referring several times to the defendant's need for drug treatment. The judge even referenced a particular program and indicated that the defendant should serve a sentence long enough to qualify for and complete the program. The defendant appealed, arguing that §3582(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act precludes courts from lengthening prison terms to promote rehabilitation. To resolve a split in the circuits, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral argument in April. In a decision authored by Justice Elena Kagan, a unanimous Court reversed the defendant's sentence. "[Section] 3582(a) tells courts that they should acknowledge that imprisonment is not suitable for the purpose of promoting rehabilitation. And when should courts acknowledge this? Section §3582(a) answers: when 'determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, [when] determining the length of the term.' So a court making these decisions should consider the specified rationales of punishment except for rehabilitation, which it should acknowledge as an unsuitable justification for a prison term. ... "The sentencing court may have had plans for [the defendant's] rehabilitation, but it lacked the power to implement them. That incapacity speaks volumes. It indicates that Congress did not intend that courts consider offenders' rehabilitative needs when imposing prison sentences," the Court said. The case is Tapia v. United States. Supreme Court rules age factor in 'Miranda' analysis BOSTON, MA -- The age of a juvenile is a factor that must be considered in determining whether the child is "in custody" for Miranda purposes, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled. The case involves a 13-year-old special education student who was questioned at school by police about recent burglaries in the neighborhood. The boy was not read his Miranda rights, nor was he told he could speak to a parent or guardian before being questioned. After the boy denied involvement in the burglaries, police told him to "do the right thing." The boy then confessed to breaking into houses with another juvenile. Despite being told he was free to leave, the juvenile continued to provide details about the burglary. He was charged with breaking and entering and larceny. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress his statement to police as violative of Miranda. The trial court denied the motion and the child was adjudicated as a delinquent. He appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The North Carolina Supreme Court, rejecting the argument that age should be considered as a factor in determining whether the suspect was in police custody, affirmed, holding that the boy was not in custody when he made the statement. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. In a 5-4 ruling the Court reversed, holding that age does inform a Miranda analysis. Writing for the majority, Justice Sonia Sotomayor reasoned that age can affect a child's perception of whether he or she is free to leave. "That is, a reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go," Sotomayor wrote. "We think it clear that courts can account for that reality without doing any damage to the objective nature of the custody analysis." Justice Samuel Alito, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas, called the majority's holding "fundamentally inconsistent with one of the main justifications for the Miranda rule: the perceived need for a clear rule that can be easily applied in all cases." The case is J.D.B. v. North Carolina. Federal court can't enjoin state court certification of class action BOSTON, MA -- A federal district court cannot enjoin a state court from certifying a product liability class action based on an earlier decision the federal court made not to certify a class in a related case brought by different plaintiffs, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled. The court exceeded its authority under the "relitigation exception" to the Anti-Injunction Act, which allows a federal court to enjoin a state court only in rare cases. The plaintiff, Keith Smith, filed a state court product liability action against Bayer Corp. over its drug Baycol, and sought class certification. Meanwhile, Bayer removed to federal court a similar case brought by a different plaintiff in the same state. The court denied class certification based on Federal Rule 23, finding that individual issues of fact predominated. Bayer then successfully moved for the federal court to enjoin the state court in the Smith case from certifying a class based on preclusion. But the Supreme Court found that a denial of class certification can only have preclusive effect on another case if two conditions are met: the issue the federal court decided must be the same as in the state court and the plaintiff must have been a party to the federal suit. "In fact ... the issues before the two courts were not the same, and Smith was neither a party nor the exceptional kind of nonparty who can be bound," wrote Justice Elena Kagan for the Court. Although the product claims and proposed class in the two cases mirrored each other, the legal standard for class certification differed between the federal court and state court, the Court said. This is because the state where plaintiffs filed, West Virginia, has explicitly criticized denials of class certification under Rule 23 based on individual issues predominating. The Court also rejected Bayer's claim that Smith was a "party" to the proposed class where certification was denied. "The definition of the term 'party' can on no account be stretched so far as to cover a person like Smith, whom the plaintiff in a lawsuit was denied leave to represent," the Court said. "The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits the order the District Court entered here. The Act's relitigation exception authorizes injunctions only when a former federal adjudication clearly precludes a state-court decision. ... Under this approach, close cases have easy answers: The federal court should not issue an injunction, and the state court should decide the preclusion question. But this case does not even strike us as close," the Court said. The case is Smith v. Bayer Corp. Published: Mon, Jun 20, 2011